Perspectives of abiotic resources

A matter of Stocks

The stocks’s stakes

Climate change – CO2 eq « stock »

[6] BP, 2020. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. [online].

[20] EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016. Carbon Dioxide Emissions Coefficients. [online].

[21] IPCC. 2018. Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development. . P. 82.

  • Oil emissions of current reserves

    • Proven reserves :

      -> 1733,9 billions barrels [6]

    • 53750,9 billion gallonsAverage on varied oil uses gives ≃ 10 kg CO2 emitted per gallon [20]

      -> 537,5 Gt CO2

  • World CO2 eq budget, current estimations : [21]

    • 1170 Gt CO2 eq to stay <2°C of global warming

    • 420 Gt CO2 eq to stay <1,5°C of global warming

  • Consomption of all current proven oil reserves is half of our total 2°C world budget and more than our total 1,5°C budget!

    • Without even considering natural gas, coal, or other emissions (CH4, for example) contributing to radiative forcing...

    • This considered, without changes, the 2°C threshold should be crossed in about 26 years

[3] BIHOUIX, P., GUILLEBON, B. ,2010. Quel futur pour les métaux?

[10] Data & Statistics,. IEA[online]. Available from : https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics

And mining is very dependent of highly carbonated, non renewable energy vectors

Adapted from [3] .The values for World averages of Electricity origin were replaced by updated data rom [10]

Production peak

[6] BP, 2020. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. [online].

[15] JANCOVICI, J-M, 2019. Les Energies fossiles. Ecole des Mines [online].

[22] World Energy Outlook 2018. IEA –International Energy Agency.

  • Hypothesis: we don’t mind CO2 eq emissions

    • Either we consider it’s not a problem

    • Or we think innovation or start-ups will solve that

    -> Exhaustion of Reserves through Production will still occur!

    • R/P ratio: most simplified model

    • Considering current reserves [6]

    • And 2019 rate of consomption [6] taken as constant for the years to come (quite unrealistic hypothesis of no flow reduction)

      -> No oil remaining in ≃ 50 years

[23] CALVO, G. et al.., 2017. Assessing maximum production peak and resource availability of non-fuel mineral resources.

[15] JANCOVICI, J-M, 2019. Les Energies fossiles. Ecole des Mines [online].

[22] World Energy Outlook 2018. IEA – International Energy Agency.

  • A slightly better estimate: the Hubbert peak model (1956)

    • We know there is no production at t = 0 and t = t final

    • The area below the production curve must be equal to the reserve

    • Regarding conventionnal oil, several countries seems to have peaked already. A review can be found here [15]

    • It is commonly believed that world production peak of conventionnal oil already happened, in 2008 [22]

Extracted from [23]

  • Reliability is influenced by several parameters

    • Uncertainty regarding reserves information

    • Particular environmental issues: health, water use, ore grade

    • Sociopolitical issues: new objects, changes of regulation, or armed conflicts

    • Interdependencies of byproducts

    • Substitution & recycling

  • That said, influence of reserves’ variation is limited when rapported to the current trends in production and growth of production

    -> Li case study: estimated reserves x 8 only delayed the peak by 46 years

Extracted from [23]

  • This recent try of systematic assessment is quite interesting to read[23] and accessible!

    • The time scaling is quite short, even for base metals

Extracted from [23]

  • Expected peak in the next 50 years : 12 metals over 47 studied: As, Bi, In, Li, Mn, Mo, Ni, Ag, Ta, Te, Zn

  • 30 metals over 47 have their expected peak in the next 100 years

  • Gold & Antimony peaked arround 2015 (agreement for Gold with [3])

Extracted from [23]

  • Taking into account the interdependencies of metals

    • Bold indicates it is the main production process of said metal

Extracted from [3]

[3] BIHOUIX, P., GUILLEBON, B. 2010. Quel futur pour les métaux?

  • Nearly a half of metals today exploited are interlinked

Extracted from [3]

Criticality

[26] GRAEDEL, T. et al., 2015. Criticality of metals and metalloids. DOI 10.1073/pnas.1500415112.

  • Notion related to the attempt to assess the relative risks concerning the availability of resources

    • Relatively recent preoccupation

    • As availability is an already complex notion, its risk analysis is also complex

      • Geological abondance & concentrations

      • Potential for substitution

      • State of the art of mining technology

      • Amount of regulatory oversight

      • Geopolitical initiatives

      • Governmental instability

      • Economic policy

    • As reserves are part of the assessment, it is also dynamic

  • Several methodologies

    • At different scales of organizations

    • For different scales of time

    • With then varied results difficult to compare between each other

Extracted from [26]

  • Criticality space: a first step is to get an overall idea

    • A number of metals are concentrated on the middle: moderately high on at least 2 axis (rare earths, Cr, Te, etc.)

    • Some are regrouped toward lower left: relatively low criticality (Fe, Mg, Ni, Mn, etc.)

    • The right side: high supply risk (In, Ag, Tl, As, Sb)

    • The particular case of Au & Pt

Extracted from [23]

  • This methodology allow the comparison of varid elements for (here at global level) :

    1. Supply risk

    2. Environmental implications

    3. Vulnerability to supply restriction

  • Keep in mind it is a relative assessment

    • Per kg comparison

  • Results may be underestimated

    • Database of 2008 (they were in the process ofupdating up to 2012 at publication in 2015)

    • As data revisions are not frequent & major technology changes occurs slowly, they recommand reassessment on a 5 years basis

Extracted from [23]

[25] HUISMAN, J., PAVEL, C., et al. 2020. Critical Raw Materials in Technologies and Sectors - Foresight [online].

Preserving stocks

Necessity & Limits of Recycling

[3] BIHOUIX, P., GUILLEBON, B. 2010. Quel futur pour les métaux?

  • Major difference between oil (energy resources) and metals (mineral ressources) :

    • Oil, Coal & Natural Gas -> mostly burned -> The flow is not retrievable

    • Metals -> mostly materially conserved -> The flow is retrievable + there is a stock in circulation!

  • Each year, stocks of metals :

    • Increases of the producted quantity

    • Decreases of the lost quantity

      • Dispersive uses (metals used as dyes or fertilizers)

      • No recycling (incineration or landfill disposal)

  • Current recycling

    • Precious metals (Au) or with moderately high value (Cu): few losses

    • Less noble metals (Al, Zn) have more important loss rates

    • No data for a lot of metals used in specific applications (electronics...)

  • Metals are one of the most interesting category of materials for recycling

    • Theoretically recyclable an infinite amount of time without diminishing their properties

    • Have high yield for stock preservation

      • 40% recycling rate -> 80% recycling rate <-> Reserves x 3

      • 50% recycling rate -> 99,9% recycling rate <-> Reserves x 500

  • Rich countries show that recycling rate can reach high levels for base metals

    • France (2010): 85% for Fe ; 80% for Al & Cu ; 70% Pb ; 50% Zn [3]

  • But it cannot do everything

    • No industrial process have a 100% efficiency -> same for recycling (remelt Al generate a dispersed loss of 1-2%)

    • A lot of our uses are not compatible with recycling

  • The trend of higher complexity

    • > 30 metals in a computer

    • > 10 alloys of Steel in a car

    • Prevent us from retrieving the resources: not easy and sometimes techically impossible to detect or separate metals of an allow

  • This phenomena exist for a lot of our metarials

    • Glass: mix of transparent & colored glasses -> no more use in most of construction or cars, only bottles

    • Plastic: often reused in less demanding uses (technically or aestetically)

-> Important to rethink life-cycles of products, raw materials, and mostly uses

  • -> Integrate less performant or pretty materials & more recycled materials

  • -> Organize recovery channels to boost recycling rate

  • -> But also question the trend of high tech solutions instead of low tech ones

  • -> That is, question the needs

  • The trend of direct dispersive uses

    • Dyes (98% of Ti used as TiO2 for white dyes)

    • Fertilizers (P, Zn, etc.)

    • Additives (Cr in Glass)

    • Pesticides (CuSO4 in some organic farming plants)

  • And « indirecty » dispersive uses (very difficult to recover)

    • 33% of Sn is used in welding

    • 50% of Zn is used in galvanizing

  • Some metals like Co or Mb are nearly exclusively used in dispersive uses or alloys

  • The socioeconomic limits

    • Economical incentives to constructors are not present or sufficient

    • Lack of reglementation and means to enforce it

    • Complexity of products and recovery channels does not help

Substitution
  • Limit the use in rare or noble metals in favor of abondant metals

    • Critical lens on « innovation »

    • Aim to maximize a low tech approach as much as possible at the level of product and technology

    -> For inorganic solar pannels, Si should be prefered to GaAs, CIGS, and others, even if the conversion efficiency is less important

  • For critical cases, possibilities needs to be carefully explored :

    • Cr nearly indispensible for anti-corrosion

      -> Ti can replace Cr in certain cases but its energy footprint is 4-5 times higher

    • Cu nearly indispensible for electrical applications

      -> Al can replace Cu in certain cases but its energy footprint is 2-3 times higher

  • Substituate oil by electrification? [27]

    • Li-ion batteries represented 37% of Li consumption in 2016 (and 40% of Co)

    • Batteries for electric vehicules were only 10% of Li-ion consumption in 2018

    • Most elements at disposal indicates that strong choices of resources’s uses will have to be made in the years to come :

[27] Responsible minerals sourcing for renewable energy, 2019. University of Technology Sydney [online].

[28] ABDALLA, A. et al., 2018. Hydrogen production, storage, transportation and key challenges with applications: A review. DOI 10.1016/j.enconman.2018.03.088

[29] SCHMIDT, O., et al., 2017. Future cost and performance of water electrolysis: An expert elicitation study. DOI 10.1016/j.ijhydene.2017.10.045

  • Substituate oil by « hydrogen »?

    • Currently > 90% of H2 is produced by steam reforming (10 kg CO2 per kg of H2 produced) [28]

    • Water electrolysis / fuel cells have problems of their own [29]

      • Alkaline electrolysis is not adapted for electric cars

      • New technologies currently depends either on Pt and are not industrially mature (PEM) or rare earths and are at the state of demonstrators (SO)

  • In need of a big & new infrastructure for supply of cars

-> We are back to the vicious circle of energy & material footprint

Challenging needs

[30] BIHOUIX, Philippe, 2014. L’Age des low techs : vers une civilisation techniquement soutenable. Seuil.

  • The often most efficient stategy to preserve abiotic resources stock

    • House thermally isolated + put on a sweater >>> room heating technical solution

    • Most transport on bicycle (short distance) + train (long distance) with minimal use of a car (occasional rental) >>> electric cars replacing current diesel and petrol cars

    • Simple dismountable and repairable electronics >>> computer assembly with glue with digital prints technology

  • It is the first of the 7 principles of low-techs [30]

    1. Challenging needs

    2. Design and produce truly sustainable

    3. Orienting knowledge to resources’ savings

    4. Striking a technical balance between performance & conviviality

    5. Relocalize without losing the right scale effects

    6. De-machinizing services

    7. Knowing to remain modest

  • Indeed this kind of transition imply numerous socioeconomical consequences

    • As any kind of transition, it is also a matter of flows and their evolution

Medias

A matter of Flow

The flows’s stakes

Climate change

[31] IPCC. 2014: mitigation of climate change: Working Group III contribution to the 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC.

  • Trajectories mitigating climate change all require a global limitation of material & energy flows

    • Even with the hypothesis of a high developpment of the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies

[32] HCC, 2020. Maîtriser l’empreinte carbone de la France. Haut Conseil pour le Climat [online].

  • The French carbon footprint

    • A large part of our carbon footprint comes from importations

  • The French situation

    • Mineral resources: metals & cement

    • Energy resources & chemical products: oil

    • Abiotic resources are a large part of it, metals in particular!

    • In terms of weight of abiotic resources in domestic emissions: oil is dominant through transport (direct emissions), followed by metals & cement (indirect and distributed emissions)

  • High mitigation potential in transport <-> Combination of varied measures [31]

    • Low-carbon fuels -> higher flows of metals & lower flow of oil

    • Lowering vehicules energy intensities -> lower flows of oil & metals

    • Encouraging modal shift to lower-carbon passenger & freight systems

      -> lower flows of oil + short-to-medium term higher flows of metals for infrastructure investments

    • Avoid journeys where possible -> lower flows of oils

  • This kind of configuration apply generally

    • Specific augmentations in flows of metal are required to lower oil flows

    • Competition between uses requiring metals -> priorities will need to be established

Economics interdependancies

[15] JANCOVICI, Jean-Marc, 2019. Les Energies fossiles. Ecole des Mines [online].

[34] HABERL, H., et al, 2020. A systematic review of the evidence on decoupling of GDP, resource use and GHG emissions, part II : synthesizing the insights. DOI 10.1088/1748-9326/ab842a.

[33] HCC, 2020. Rapport annuel - Redresser le cap, relancer la transition. Haut Conseil pour le Climat [online]. 2020.

  • At world scale, there is a historical link between primary energy & material consumption, and economic production (as measured by GDP) [15] & [34]

    • There is no consensus on the exact nature of the relationship nowadays [33]

    • But we know that energy & material availability enables GDP growth

    • And GDP growth, by anticipation of economic growth causes energy & material use

  • A lot of ambitious climate target rely on the concept of « decoupling » [34]

    • Promotion of economic growth while reducing material & energy footprint (EMF)

    • When theorized as absolute -> EMF reduction & GDP growth

    • When theorized as relative -> EMF slow growth & GDP high growth

  • Recent systematic review clarifies that :

    • Relative decoupling is frequent for material use, GHG emissions, but not exergy

    • Relative decoupling of GDP and primary energy use can be caused by energy efficiency (higher ratio of exergy / primary energy use)

    • Absolute decoupling situations are very rare and are related to small short-term reductions of emissions

    • No evidence that absolute decoupling can be generalized

  • Degrowth/Sufficiency currently seems indispensible to meet climate target and sustainable use of abiotic resources:

    • Require a contraction of current economics functionning

    • And even fundamental changes in its functionning too

    • A byproduct of this scientific inquiries is that GDP is more & more considered as an irrelevant indicator for these problematics

Volatility of prices

[35] ECORYS, 2012. Mapping resource prices: the past & the future [online]. Final report to European Comission.

  • Base metals’ prices are historically quite constant relatively to each others but individual resource’s price is highly volatile [35]

[6] BP, 2020. BP Statistical Review of World Energy. [online].

  • Oil’s price is highly volatile too[6]

  • Resources’s prices underlying determinations

    • Percieved availability through control of producers

    • Degree of substitutability

  • Resources’s prices mecanisms of formations

    • Over-the-counter (OTC) markets: traditionnal mecanism

    • Annual or multi-year supply contracts: mainly, Fe and Fe allows

    • Pricing on forward markets

    • Special case of precious metals: considered as quasi-money or OTC.

  • Historically, numerous resources exchanges were operated by intermediates

    • Contemporary period: developpment of financialization

    • Alignment of Raw materials on securities -> far less intermediaries

    • Developpment of financial product derivatives + capitalistic concentrations of producers

      -> overvalued prices and speculations

[36] MITTEAU, Gilles, 2018. Economie et finance du pétrole - Heu?reka. [online].

  • Financial markets’s specific effects

    • Efficiency of market -> Trends of prices themselves tend to diseapear

    • Short-term interest of traders -> Short-term volatility

    • Complexity of the product and implications of prices variations on the economy

      -> Long-term volatility + impossibility to know for sure the causes of prices variations

    -> There is no « natural price-signalling » mecanism that makes a non- renewable resource progressively more expensive overtime

    -> The « natural » functionning of Financial markets seems to impply that the reduction of energy & material flows lead to higher volatility, or maybe higher « volatility of volatility »

For detailed reasonning, strong recommendation of Youtuber Heu?reka on Economy & Finance of oil

Contracting flows

Limits of efficiency
  • Like recycling, energy efficiency is necessary

    • Allow to reduce flows for a given performance

    • 25% energy yield -> 30% energy yield -> 1/6 of oil flows spared per year

    • 25% energy yield -> 50% energy yield -> 1/2 of oil flows spared per year

    • Same goes for « material efficiency » (diminshing the quantity of material needed to achieve a given functionnality)

  • But it is not sufficient, and could even be harmful on the global scale

    • Energy efficiency, when only measure applied, have mainly cost reduction effects

    • Cost reduction could then lead to democratize preexisting uses or create new ones

    • This then would lead to an overall increase in energy consumption

[37] SORRELL, Steve, 2007. The Rebound Effect: an assessment of the evidence for economy-wide energy savings from improved energy efficiency. [online]. UKERC

  • This would be called a « rebound effect » [37]

    • The « economy-wide » rebound effect is of combination of direct and indirect rebound effects that can interact with each other

  • Some basic examples of direct rebound effect :

    • If fuel-efficient vehicules make travel cheaper -> Consumers may choose to drive further / more often -> Offsets the energy savings

    • If a factory uses energy more efficiently -> Becomes more profitable -> May generate further investments -> More production

  • Some basic examples of indirect rebound effect :

    • Drivers of fuel-efficient cars may spend the money saved bying petrol on other energy intensive goods or services (ex: overseas flight)

[38] JEVONS, William Stanley, 1865. The Coal Question. . 1865. P. 213.

  • Rebound effect concept coms back to the XIXth century

    • Firstly known as « Jevons paradox » from W. J. Jevons [38]

    • Steam-engines’ efficiency had been increased by 10-fold at least in a century

    • Consumption of coal had greatly increased anyway (x 6 in 50 years)

  • The same considerations could be made about today :

    • Energy efficiency of cars’ engines have never been better

    • Our oil cosumption dedicated to it have never been higher

    -> Could be explained by:

    • The growth of car use driven by low cost of oil

    • And spared cost of cars invested in high-tech supplementary functions which increase car’s weight and maintain oil consumption

    • The increase in heavy vehicules like SUVs

[39] STERN, David I., 2017. How accurate are energy intensity projections?. DOI 10.1007/s10584-017-2003-3.

  • Quantified contemporary estimations are complicated :

    • There is indeed a correlation between various measures of energy efficiency and continuing growth of overall energy consumption

    • But the causal links between these trends are not clear

    • Difficulty to assess other things than direct rebound effects

  • That being said, evidence suggest that : [37]

    • It has the potential to widely vary between technologies, sectors, income groups

    • In OECD countries, automotive transport, household heating & cooling can relatively robustly be considered subjects to a direct rebound effect of 10-30% (microscale)

    • Current energy or material efficiency policies are not up to the task (macroscale)

  • Predictions of energy footprint decline itself are generally too optimistic [39]

Physics inevitability

[40] HALL, Charles A. S., et al., 2014. EROI of different fuels and the implications for society. DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.049.

  • Material & Energy flows will decline anyway due to the physics underlying the production peak

    • We’ve seen that the decline in ores’s grade do lead to an exponential demand in energy for base metals extraction, and that a mineralogical barrier can happen for rarer metals

    • But oil itself needs energy to be extracted!

  • Last notion of this course : EROI – Energy return on investment

    • Ratio of energy delivered by a specific energy vector and the energy invested in the capture & delivery of this energy

    • Measures the relative quality of energy vectors

  • Varied possible choices of boundaries in systemic assessments, so as much EROI calculations: standard ; point of use ; extended ; societal

    • Estimates re complicated due to oil compagnies low level of transparency

  • As oil is often extracted together with natural gas, calculations can be tricky

    • But all estimates tend to show a progressive decrease in EROI for every place where data is available : here in USA

  • Is there a trend for oil already?

    • It seems so

    • All estimates tend to show a progressive decrease in EROI for every place where data is available : here in USA

  • Is there a trend for oil already?

    • Pretty much so!

    • All estimates tend to show a progressive decrease in EROI for every place where data is available : here in Canada

  • Is there a trend for oil already?

    • Undeniably so!

    • All estimates tend to show a progressive decrease in EROI for every place where data is available : here in various other countries

  • It is logical from what we’ve seen about the concentration of resources in general. But why does it especially matter here?

    • The decrease of the EROI of conventionnal oil means we’ll need to set aside a growing share of the oil flows just to continue to have a flow

    • This share of oil « lost » will no longer be used to supply other sectors [36]

    • Non conventionnal oils have a base EROI quite lower than conventionnal (and will also decrease with their further exploitation) [40]

Managing consequences, tackling causes

[36] MITTEAU, Gilles, 2018. Economie et finance du pétrole -Heu?reka. [online].

[40] HALL, Charles A. S., et al., 2014. EROI of different fuels and the implications for society. DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.049.

[33] HCC, 2020. Rapport annuel -Redresser le cap, relancer la transition. Haut Conseil pour le Climat [online]. 2020. 

  • As there is no absolute decoupling, a contraction & instability of economy and as we know it seems unavoidable in the medium-term, regardless of climate change [36] & [40]

    • By « economy », here, we mean that all socioeconomical & geopolitical relationships will be impacted

    • Social acceptability of dynamics created by contracting flows will be a key component of the success ofmitigating policies [33]

    -> Ecological transition is also a social one

  • This is were we, as engineers & citizens, have apart to play

  • We would gain a lot to take inspiration from the 7 principles of low-techs [30]

    1. Challenging needs

    2. Design and produce truly sustainable

    3. Orienting knowledge to resources’ savings

    4. Striking a technical balance between performance & conviviality

    5. Relocalize without losing the right scale effects

    6. De-machinizing services

    7. Knowing to remain modest

[30] BIHOUIX, Philippe, 2014. L’Age des low techs : vers une civilisation techniquement soutenable. Seuil.

Medias